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Abstract
Tax relief for private donations towards the provision of collective goods can pro-
tect minorities from majority-driven outcomes in which tax revenues are exclusively
used to finance the provision of public goods that are only valued by the majority.
In this paper we show that non-discriminatory tax relief for private donations can
arise in political equilibrium as a strategic commitment device aimed at creating and
supporting political alliances that would not otherwise be able to coalesce.
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1. Introduction
Because of budgetary pressures, governments have increasingly come to rely on
the private sector for the provision of collective goods and services. Accordingly,
there has been a growing focus in the public debate on how government incentives for
private contributions – typically delivered in the form of tax reliefs – should be struc-
tured; and, more specifically, on whether they should be offered indiscriminately,
without varying the level of relief depending on the extent to which different types
of donations generate a “public benefit”, and without limit on the size of donations
that can benefit from relief.1
In this paper, we re-examine the political-economy rationale for non-discriminato-
ry donation relief: can non-discriminatory donation relief, as we observe it, be ratio-
nalized as an equilibrium outcome of political competition?
Our paper is a first attempt to build a bridge between two main strands of liter-
ature on the voluntary provision of public goods. The first has focused on how tax
policy and government spending affect charitable giving (Warr, 1982, 1983; Roberts,
1984, 1987; Bernheim, 1986; and Bergstrom et al., 1986). With reference to the subsi-
dization of private donations, this literature has shown that diverting public funds
towards tax relief for private giving can raise the total level of provision of public
goods above the level that could be achieved if the same public funds were used
directly to provide the goods (Andreoni and Bergstrom, 1994).
The second, more recent, strand of literature has examined public provision choi-
ces by elected representatives when public goods can also be provided privately and
the role that such provision choices play in the determination of political outcomes
(Epple and Romano, 1996a, 1996b; Gouveia, 1997; Scharf, 2000; Horstmann et al.,
2007; Horstmann and Scharf, 2008). One of the key conclusions from this literature is
that majorities may prefer a mixed regime of public provision with private donations
over either pure private provision or pure public provision, and may deploy tax relief
1See National Audit Office, 2013; and The Surprising Relationship Between Taxes and Charitable Giv-
ing, the Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2015; Tax Expenditures: Overview and Analysis, Congressional
Research Office, April 30, 2015; The Political Economy of Tax Expenditures, Athena Kalya, Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, slide presentation at the ECFin Taxation Workshop, Brus-
sels, October 19, 2015.
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strategically to shift the burden of provision onto minority donors.
The above-mentioned studies are concerned with situations where only one type
of public good is provided and where individuals are only heterogeneous in their
preferences over levels of public good provision. In practice, collective provision typ-
ically involves multiple goods and services,2 and each of those goods and services
can vary in their characteristics, characteristics that different individuals value dif-
ferently.3 Thus individual preferences will also be heterogeneous with respect to the
composition of collective good provision, not just with respect to how much provision
there should be. This means that, in regimes where collective goods are privately
provided, in part or in full, by minorities, these minorities will direct their donations
towards the kinds of collective goods that they favour rather than towards those that
the majority favours, implying a reduced scope for the majority to rely on private
provision by minorities – and thus a reduced scope for leveraging on tax relief for
this purpose.
In such cases the private provision of public goods can serve to fill a minority de-
mand that left unmet by majority-driven public provision choices (Weisbrod, 1975),
and so non-discriminatory donation relief can be viewed as a concession by the major-
ity to minorities – a concession that protects minorities from the “tyranny of the ma-
jority” in relation to the composition of collective good provision. Still, why should
the ruling majority agree to such a concession? In other words, why do we observe
majority-sanctioned tax relief being granted on donations towards collective goods
that are not valued by the majority? In this paper we argue that subsidies to private
giving can be used as a locking-in mechanism that enables heterogeneous groups to
2Transactional data obtained from the UK’s Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) shows that between
June 2009 and July 2014, there were: 4.5 million donations made to over 80,000 different UK registered
charities.
3This can be true whether or not the goods and services provided satisfy similar needs. For exam-
ple, in the UK, there are seventeen donkey sanctuaries registered with the UK’s Charities Commission
and each of those has a different mission statement – the Island Farm Donkey Sanctuary aims to “house
donkeys and some other animals who are neglected and abused”, while the Isle of Wight Donkey Sanc-
tuary has a three-pronged mission aiming to “Provide health-care and welfare for abandoned, rescued
and homeless donkeys. To educate children about the heritage and roles of donkeys. To support other
charities through association with our donkeys.”
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cement political alliances.
The premise of this argument is that tax incentives for giving are enshrined in
the tax system and cannot be easily overturned in the short run. Tax constitutions in
developed countries typically prescribe a two-speed system for tax policy changes:
a fast track that allows governments to easily change tax rates and levels of public
spending, and a slow track for structural tax reforms.4 And indeed, over the last
twenty years UK governments have changed either the tax rate or the income brackets
every year, but the subsidy rate to donation reliefs has been modified only three times.
The same pattern is in evidence when we look at the US case: while tax rates or
income brackets have been changed almost every two years, tax relief provisions have
been modified only nine times over the past eighty years.
Tax relief is linked to tax rates,5 and so changes in the level of taxation, which can
4This two speed system has evolved from principles that were first enshrined in the Magna Carta of
1215: first, governors had the right to collect taxes to be able to pursue the common good; second, any
reform of the tax system required the consensus of commune consilium regni (Lindsey, 2003). To approve
tax and spending changes, a simple majority of the Parliament is sufficient in the UK system, and a
simple majority is sufficient in both chambers in the US system (Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949).
On the other hand, modifying the structure of taxes in the US requires a simple majority in the lower
chamber and 60% of the votes in the Senate (alternatively, tax reform can be accomplished through a
budgetary “reconciliation procedure”; Congressional Budget Act of 1974). In the UK a simple majority
is sufficient, but the House of Lords can unilaterally suspend the decision for a maximum of one year
before it can be debated again.
5Tax relief provisions vary across countries. In the US, individuals who claim itemized deductions
are allowed a federal income tax deduction for gifts and other donations of property to charitable
organizations of up to 50% of adjusted gross income when the donation is to a public charity, and
30% of income when it is made to a private foundation. Corporations can also claim a deduction,
but are subject to a lower ceiling of 10% of net income. In Canada, the federal government and the
provinces offer a two-tiered income tax credit to individuals and corporations for charitable donations:
for donations below $200, the federal basic credit rate is 15%, while every dollar donated above $200 is
credited at a federal rate of 29%, thus allowing middle income taxpayers who make large donations to
claim at a rate in excess of their personal tax rate (in some provinces combined federal and provincial
credits can surpass 50% for large gifts). In the UK, there is a governmental match of 20 pence for each
pound donated out of after tax income. In addition, higher-rate taxpayers can claim a 20 pence rebate
on each pound donated out of after-tax income For a full discussion of the UK system and of donation
responses to UK tax incentives, see Almunia et al. (2018).
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be enacted upon comparatively more quickly, also entail changes in the implied level
of public subsidization of private giving by minorities. Linking taxation and donation
subsidies in this way can be pivotal to how minorities rank different candidates in a
political contest, and can thus affect political outcomes. Non-discriminatory tax relief
effectively removes a dimension of ex-post political discretion that may otherwise
cause a candidate to lose the support of a subset of minority voters. What we show
in the theoretical analysis that follows is that, if changes to the structure of tax relief
provisions are sufficiently slow to enact, tax relief can arise in political equilibrium as
a means of supporting political alliances that would not otherwise be sustainable.
To develop our arguments, we focus on a model of political competition where
there are multiple collective goods and where public provision can be augmented by
private donations. In this setting we characterize policy choices and political out-
comes with and without non-discriminatory tax relief for private donations (i.e. tax
relief that does not discriminate across donations towards different collective goods).
First, we show that, if changing the structure of tax reliefs involves a sufficient
time lag, an incumbent policy-maker would never want to commit to a given tax
rate level but may want to introduce non-discriminatory tax relief for donations in
order to secure her re-election in the next period. Second, we demonstrate that tax
reliefs can arise in equilibrium at a constitutional stage – whether citizen vote over
the permanent introduction of tax reliefs or just over the introduction of procedural
rules that make it comparatively more difficult to overturn tax relief provisions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
characterizes the collective and voluntary provision of collective goods under differ-
ent tax regimes. In Section 3 we analyze how different tax regimes affect political
competition. Section 4 show how tax relief can arise endogenously in equilibrium.
Section 5 concludes. Proofs of results are given in the Appendix.
2. Policy choices and private contributions
We describe a model of public and private provision choices and voting choices
in an economy with heterogeneous agents. Individuals differ from one another with
respect to their preferences for two different varieties of public goods, with respect
to their preferred level of public good provision, or with respect to both. Individuals
4
vote for one of a set of candidates who run for public office. The winning candi-
date decides both the level of public provision for each good and the level of tax
relief to apply for each good, with the required public funds being raised through a
uniform tax. Public provision can be augmented by private donations that are non-
cooperatively selected by individuals, as in Bergstrom et al. (1986). The outcome of
the election and the actions that ensue from such outcome (tax policies and donation
choices) are fully anticipated by all voters.
This section describes our set-up and characterizes donation choices and policy
choices in alternative tax regimes. Implications for political competition are discussed
in Section 3.
2.1. Endowments and preferences
Our analytical setup is deliberately simple, for tractability and to best highlight the
structure of our arguments. The specialized setting we use is nevertheless sufficiently
rich to allow for the various regimes that could occur in a less restrictive environment.
Consider an economy with N ≥ 3 individuals who each receive utility from pri-
vate consumption and from the consumption of two public good varieties, identified
by k ∈ {a, b} ≡ K. The two varieties can each be provided privately from individuals’
income or publicly through tax revenues. The total amount provided for each is the
sum of public provision and private provision, and is denoted as G(k), k ∈ {a, b} ≡ K
(or, in vector notation, as G =
(
G(k), k ∈ K
)
).
Individuals all have identical pre-tax incomes, y, but differ from one another with
respect to their preferences for the two different varieties of public goods and their
preferences for public goods vs. private consumption. Individuals belong to one of
three preference types, denoted by j ∈ {a, b, 0} ≡ J = K ∪ {0}, each represented in
the population in a proportion qj < 1, with ∑j qj = 1. (For notational ease, we will
use j− to refer to the complement in K of a type j ∈ K, i.e. a− = b and b− = a.)
Individuals of type j = 0 place no value on public goods. Individuals of type j 6= 0
have a positive marginal valuation for public good variety j, which is equal to η up to
a level of provision equal to Ĝ > 0, falling to η̂ < η above Ĝ; and a constant marginal
valuation η < η̂ (also implying η < η) for public good variety j−. Types a and b
thus place a positive value on public goods, but each favour a different public good
variety. Each has a piecewise concave total valuation for the public good it favours
5
more (which, under suitable conditions, yields an interior solution with respect to the
choice of provision) and a linear total valuation for the good it favours less.6 We can
represent these preferences with the following type-specific utility functions:
Type j = 0 : U0(ci0, G) = c
i
0;
Type j = a : Ua(cia, G) = c
i
a + η̂ G(a) + (η − η̂)min{G(a), Ĝ}+ η G(b);
Type j = b : Ub(cib, G) = c
i
b + η̂ G(b) + (η − η̂)min{G(b), Ĝ}+ η G(a);
where cij is private consumption of an individual i of type j, and where η > η̂ > η.
The distinction between type-0 individuals and type-j 6= 0 individuals isolates het-
erogeneity with respect to preferred levels of provision; whereas the distinction be-
tween type-a and type-b individuals isolates heterogeneity in preferences with re-
spect to the preferred mix of public goods.
Figure 1 depicts the total valuation that an individual of type j 6= 0 places on vary-
ing quantities respectively of public good j and public good j−. The kink corresponds
to the allocation Ĝ of public good variety j at which the marginal valuation falls from
η to η̂.
The marginal cost of provision is unity for both public good varieties. Govern-
ment spending is financed through a proportional income tax levied at rate, t. Public
goods can be publicly provided by government at levels Z(k) ≥ 0, k ∈ K (Z =(
Z(k), k ∈ K
)
in vector notation). Additionally, there can be government subsidies
for private contributions towards the two public good varieties. Donation subsidies
are typically offered in the form of a tax deduction, which has the effect of lowering
the price of giving to donors;7 for the purpose of our analysis, such relief can be equiv-
alently modelled as taking the form of proportional subsidy rates s(k), k = {a, b}, that
are applied to the gross-of-subsidy donation value. Thus, given a donation vi(k) by
individual i towards public good variety k, a subsidy s(k) > 0 reduces the price of
giving to donors by a factor 1− s(k).
6Assuming the valuation for the less favoured variety to be also concave would have no effect on
the analysis or results. We assume linearity for the sake of simplicity.
7In some countries (e.g., the US) the relief is structured as a deduction of the donation made from
taxable income; in others UK the system has both a rebate and a match component, with the latter being
paid directly by government to charities and being equal to the tax payable on the match-inclusive







Figure 1: Total valuation by individuals of type j ∈ {a, b}
for levels of public good varieties k = j and k 6= j
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In outcomes where choices are symmetric across individuals of the same type (the
cases we shall focus on), levels of taxation, public good provision and subsidization









where vj(k) denotes individual donations by type-j individuals towards public good






vj(k) = (1− t)y. (2)
We consider two alternative scenarios: in one scenario the levels of donation sub-
sidy, s(k), can be selected by the policy-maker independently of the income tax rate,
t; in the other, s(k) is constrained to be equal to the tax rate (i.e. it must take the form
of a 100% deduction of donations from taxable income).
We study a game characterized by the following sequence of actions: citizens ob-
serve the set of candidates and vote under a plurality-rule electoral system; the win-
ner of the election is the candidate with the most votes, and that winner then becomes
the policy-maker (stage 1); the elected policy-maker chooses a level of taxation and
levels of public spending on each of the two public goods from the available funds
(stage 2); citizens observe levels of public spending on each of the two public good
varieties and simultaneously select private donations towards each of these varieties
(stage 3).8 We restrict attention to sub-game perfect equilibria of the above game, and
proceed to solve for an equilibrium by backward induction.
In the rest of this section we shall focus on the last two stages of the above se-
quence, that is on private donation choices and optimal policy choices that anticipate
donation responses. Implications for elections (stage 1) and for constitutional design
are discussed in Section 3.
2.2. Contribution equilibria for given tax/subsidy regimes
We consider symmetric Nash equilibria of the last-stage, simultaneous-donations
game. The amounts given towards each collective good variety by individuals of type
8This is consistent with the way choices are sequenced in a citizen-candidate model of political
competition (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997).
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j can be characterized as in the standard non-cooperative model of private provision
of a public good where each individual chooses her own contribution taking others’
contributions as given (Bergstrom et al., 1986).
In equilibrium, type-0 individuals never contribute to any variety of public good,
since their valuation for both public good varieties is zero. Individuals of type j 6= 0
contribute to the provision of a public good variety if the price of giving is lower or
equal than to their marginal valuation for that variety, η ∈ {η, η̂, η} (η < η̂ < η).
As previously discussed, for a subsidy rate s(k) ∈ [0, 1], the price of giving to-
wards good variety k is 1− s(k).9 Then, depending on the size of the subsidy, there
are three possible regimes:
(i) if the subsidy rate is such that 1− s(k) > η, then no donations toward any good
variety will take place;
(ii) if the subsidy rate is such that η̂ < 1− s(k) ≤ η, donations towards public good
variety k = j by type j are vj(j) = (Ĝ− Z(j))/(qjN); while type j−’s donation
towards variety j are zero (given that η < η̂ < 1− s(k));
(iii) if the subsidy rate is such that 1− s(k) ≤ η̂ an individual of type j = k will
donate all of her disposable income towards her more favoured public good
variety, but she still will not contribute to her less favoured good variety j−
(given that η < η̂).
In order to highlight the role of subsidies, we focus on scenarios where η < 1
and so there are no private contributions without subsidies. We also assume that
Ĝ < Ny/2, i.e. the economy’s aggregate resources are sufficient to achieve levels of
9As is customary in the literature, it is assumed that donors do not “see behind the veil” of the
government budget constraint and therefore do not internalize the effect that their donation has on
the government budget constraint through the subsidy. This is typically justified on the grounds that,
at the margin, adjustments in the government budget may involve adjustments in private transfers
(which we do not model here) rather than adjustments in spending. In addition, in the framework we
are studying, even if donors were fully sophisticated and could see behind the government’s budget,
and even if marginal adjustments were on government spending, these would typically be on spend-
ing for a good that is less favoured by the donor rather than on spending for the good towards which
the donation is directed.
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provision equal to Ĝ for both public good varieties and also leave some resources for
private consumption.
2.3. Policy choices with no contribution subsidies
We first examine the case where, in stage 2, there are no contribution subsidies
(s(k) = 0, k ∈ K), and the policy-maker in office only makes choices with respect to
levels of taxation and levels of public good provision, which must satisfy the budget
constraint Nty = Z(a) + Z(b).
In the final stage, citizens observe Z and obtain after-tax income (1− t)y. As η < 1,
by assumption, for s(k) = 0, k ∈ K, donations are zero. In what follows, without loss
of generality we assume y = 1.
A policy-maker of type 0 will always select t = 0 and a zero level of public provi-
sion for both public good varieties.
A policy-maker of type j 6= 0 would use all tax revenues to fund provision of
public good variety j, which she values more than variety j−, even for G(j) > Ĝ.
However, she would select a positive tax rate t > 0 if and only if it generates a positive
surplus ηNty− ty for her own type; this requires
η > 1/N; (3)
i.e. that the private marginal cost of funding provision through taxes (which equals
1/N) be at least η, the valuation of her favoured public good variety (which is where
tax revenues will be spent). We additionally assume
η̂ < 1/N, (4)
which, given that Ĝ < Ny/2, implies that policy-makers will select a tax rate t < 1
that leaves some income for private consumption, rather than selecting a rate t = 1
that directs all of the economy’s income towards public good provision.
The conditions on the preference parameters that define the scenarios of interest
can then be summarized as follows:
Assumption 1. η ≤ η̂ < 1/N < η < 1.
Under these conditions, a policy-maker of type j 6= 0 always chooses a tax rate tN =
Ĝ/N to finance public provision of her favoured good variety at the level Ĝ and
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does not engage in public provision of the public good variety she likes less. Absent
subsidies, private contributions are zero.
2.4. Policy choices with untied contribution subsidies
Suppose next that ad valorem contribution subsidies at rates s(k) ∈ [0, 1], k ∈ K,
are available to the policy-maker. It may then be profitable for a policy-maker of type
j 6= 0 to fully or partially rely on subsidies on private donations for the provision of
either public good variety j, or variety j−, or both.
A subsidy on private contributions towards k lowers the private price of giving
from unity to 1− s(k), with the gap between the private cost and total cost of dona-
tions being publicly funded. The government’s budget constraint therefore becomes
∑k∈K Z(k) + ∑k∈K s(k)V(k) = Nty, where V(k) = ∑j vj(j) is total private donations
towards public good variety k.
Consider now the choices faced by a policy-maker of type j 6= 0. By financing her
favoured variety through taxation, the cost of provision is shared by all taxpayers,
and the individual unit cost paid by each citizen (including the policy-maker) is the
lowest possible, 1/N. When subsidies to private contributions are put in place, no
matter how large the subsidy is, it will always be the case that the cost of private pro-
vision of variety j is incurred by type-j individuals disproportionately more than by
type-j− individuals. Thus, if the policy-maker relies on private donations (entirely or
partially), the cost of provision is incurred disproportionately more by type-j individ-
uals, including the policy-maker. Therefore, a policy-maker of type j 6= 0 will always
choose to fully provide good j publicly without subsidizing private donations of va-
riety j. Given that η̂ < 1/N, however, the policy-maker would never select a policy
such that Z(j) > Ĝ. Thus, Z(j) = Ĝ; and since donations are zero for G(j) ≥ Ĝ and
s(j) = 0, we conclude that G(j) = Z(j) = Ĝ.
Under Assumption 1 the policy-maker never publicly provides the good variety
she likes less. However, from the point of view of the same policy-maker, a subsidy
on donations towards j− can be used to manipulate the level of private donations in
the direction of a desired level of variety j− exploiting private donations of group j−.
Even so, the policy-maker would never adopt a positive subsidy rate for variety j−
such that individuals of her own type (type j) make donations towards variety j−, as
the private cost to individuals of type j in this case would be 1/N > η.
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Suppose then that the policy-maker adopts a positive subsidy rate such that only
citizens of type j− make private donations toward variety j−, i.e. such that η <
1− s(j−) < η (which results in a level of private provision of variety j− equal to Ĝ).
In this case, we know from our previous argument that she would choose Z(j) = Ĝ;
and that, in order to trigger private donations by type j−, the subsidy rate must be
such that 1− s(j−) ≤ η. The minimum level of subsidy that can sustain donations
towards variety j− (and that maximizes the policy-maker’s payoff in this regime) is
therefore s(j−) = 1− η. The individual cost borne by all citizens, included type-j,
if there are positive private donations toward variety j−, subsidized at rate s(j−), is
s(j−)Ĝ/N. If type-j’s valuation for variety j− is not high enough, i.e. η < (1− η)/N,
the marginal cost paid by type-j individuals to finance private donations toward va-
riety j− is higher than the marginal utility from consumption η. In this case a policy-
maker would never subsidize donations toward the public good she likes less. The
following discussion focuses on scenarios where the above condition is met, imply-
ing that, absent a tie-in, the subsidy is zero (whether or not discriminatory subsidies
are allowed):




Under Assumption 2, a policy-maker of type j never subsidizes donations toward
variety j−:
Lemma 1. If η < (1− η)/N < η̂ < 1/N < η, a policy-maker of type j 6= 0 will always
choose (Z, t, s) such that subsidy rates satisfy 1− s(k) > η (i.e. s(k) < 1− η), k ∈ {A, B},
public provision levels are Z(j) = Ĝ and Z(j−) = 0, and the tax rate is t = Ĝ/N ≡ tN.
Proof in the Appendix.
2.5. Policy choices with tied contribution subsidies (tax relief)
We next characterize policy choices under an institutional constraint that directly
ties the subsidy to the tax rate, i.e. a constraint s(k) = t, k ∈ K, as implied under a
system where private donations attract income tax relief.10
10This need not be a permanent constraint: tax relief provisions may be changed by policy-makers
but, once in place, they constrain tax policy choices in the short run.
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The tie-in between tax rate and subsidy rate implies that a policy-maker of type j is
obliged to offer a donation subsidy s(k) = t, k ∈ K, for donations towards all public
good varieties, including variety j−, if she wants to raise tax revenues to provide
variety j publicly, irrespectively of how much she values good j−. In mechanical
terms, this constraint can be thought of as involving two separate constraints, a non-
discrimination constraint, s(k) = s, k ∈ K, and a further tie-in constraint s = t. The
only tax instrument in this case is t.
For 1 − s = 1 − t > η, there will be no private donations to either variety; for
η̂ < 1− t ≤ η total donations would be V(k) = Ĝ− Z(k), k ∈ K; and for 1− t ≤ η̂
total donations would be V(k) = qk N − Z(k), k ∈ K.
A policy-maker of type 0 always chooses s = t = 0 in the absence of any con-
straint, and so a tie-in is immaterial if the policy-maker is of this type.
As previously shown (Lemma 1), a policy-maker of type j 6= 0 would, without
a tie-in, choose s(k) to be less than 1− η (and thus to have no effect on donations if
positive), and a tax rate tN = Ĝ/N. Then, if 1− tN > η, selecting a level of taxation
equal to tN under a constraint s = t and using the revenues to provide variety j at
level Ĝ would trigger donations by type j− towards variety j−. This would, in turn,
reduce the level of public provision of variety j below Ĝ and trigger donations by
type j towards variety j. The policy-maker then faces two options: she could either
choose to raise the tax rate (and thus the subsidy rate) to the level, tS, that generates
enough revenue to publicly provide Z(j) = Ĝ units of variety j and also cover the
cost of subsidies to private giving towards variety j−; or she could reduce the tax
rate, tZ, to the point where the subsidy become ineffective at triggering donations,
which requires public provision of variety j to be reduced below Ĝ.
Consider the first option: the policy-maker rises the tax rate to t = tS > 1− η
to provide Z(j) = Ĝ and cover the cost of private donations toward variety j−. If
donations towards j− equal V(j−) = Ĝ, the government’s budget constraint is tSN =





However, if donations by j−-type individuals exhaust their income before their total
level of subsidized donations reaches Ĝ ( i.e. (1− tS′)Ĝ > qj−N) the subsidized level
of provision of variety j− will be Ġ = qj−N/(1− tS) < Ĝ.
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The government’s budget constraint in this case is tSN = Ĝ + tSnj−/(1 − tS),
where nj− = qj−N, giving a tax rate tS = tS′′.
The rest of our discussion rules out unrealistic scenario where, with a subsidy
s = tS, type-j− individuals would use all their income to make donations towards
collective consumption, making their private consumption equal to zero.
The alternative option for the policy-maker is to choose to publicly provide variety
j at a level below Ĝ and lower t up to a point where a tie-in tZ = s does not trigger
donations:
tZ = 1− η. (6)
A subsidy rate s(k) = tZ shuts down donations by all types, allowing the policy-
maker to devote all public funds to providing variety j, resulting in a gain to the
policy-maker equal to (η − η) tZN.
The policy-maker’s optimal choice in this case can be determined simply by com-
paring the level of payoff the policy-maker obtains under each alternative: her payoff
for t = tS, where Z(j) = Ĝ and where there are donations V(j−) = min{Ĝ, nj−/(1−
tS)} subsidized at rate tS; and her payoff for t = tZ (or more precisely just below it),
in a regime where there are no private donations and public provision of variety j is
at level tZN < Ĝ.
The difference between the payoff levels obtained by policy-maker under the two
regimes is increasing in η and decreasing in η; and so the minimum value of η that
satisfies the inequality, which we shall denote as η̃, is a decreasing function of η. Thus,
η > η̃ represents a sufficient condition for a subsidy tie-in to induce the policy-maker
to offer a positive level of subsidy:
Lemma 2. For Ĝ < G̃, if η ≤ (N − Ĝ)/N a tie-in constraint has no effect on the choice of
the policy-maker of type j 6= 0. If (N − Ĝ)/N < η ≤ η̃, it induces a policy-maker to select
t = tZ = 1− η, lowering the level of public provision of variety j to (1− η)N < Ĝ and
leaving donations towards both varieties at zero. If η > η̃ it results in a choice of tax (and
subsidy) t = tS′ = Ĝ/(N − Ĝ) and a level Ĝ of donations towards variety j−. A sufficient
condition for the latter to occur is η > η̃MIN.
Proof in the Appendix.
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It is worth noting that a partial tie-in that allows relief to be zero for one of the two
collective good varieties would have no effect on policy choices, as a majority type-
j 6= 0 policy-maker would, in that case, restrict tax relief to donations towards variety
j (which would, in turn, be redundant as no donations towards variety j would take
place for Z(j) = Ĝ).
3. Tax relief for donations and political competition
Moving now to stage 1 of the game, we study the implications of a subsidy tie-
in for the outcome of political competition. Our focus is on scenarios where there
is no absolute majority type (and so there is meaningful political competition), i.e.
qj < 1/2, j ∈ J, and where qa > q0 > qb (implying that in a contest between a type-a
and a type-b candidate, the former always win).11 We first discuss how a subsidy
tie-in affects voting outcomes and then how a tie-in can arise endogenously as part of
a fiscal constitution.
3.1. Subsidy tie-in and Condorcet outcomes
To characterize political outcomes in a representative system, we first look at the
level of support that a candidate can expect to receive in a sequence of two-candidate
majority voting races; that is, we look at the outcomes of two-candidate elections in
which voters do not use weakly-dominated strategies. Since no single type consti-
tutes a majority, the preferences of two out of three types will dictate the outcome
of the election.12 Implications for the case of plurality voting are discussed in the
following subsection.
In all cases, the most-preferred candidate type for each citizen is always one of
their own type, irrespectively of whether or not a subsidy tie-in is present.
To understand how individuals rank candidates of a type different from their own,
suppose first that there is no subsidy tie-in. If the policy-maker is of type 0, the utility
11The case qa < q0 < qb is symmetrically identical.
12We assume that candidacy involves no cost, and so standing for election is always a weakly un-
dominated strategy. We also assume that no citizen enters if another citizen of the same type does;
since entering when there is another citizen of the same type entering as a candidate cannot produce
a better electoral outcome for the second entrant, and could produce a worse one. This allows us to
ignore repetitive equilibria.
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of all types is y = 1 ≡ Uj(0). If the policy-maker is of type j 6= 0, then the utility
of type j− is 1− tN + ηĜ = 1− (1/N − η)Ĝ ≡ Uj−(j 6= 0) < 1, and the utility of
a type-0 individual is 1− tN = 1− Ĝ/N < 1 ≡ U0(j 6= 0). Thus, absent a subsidy
tie-in, the ranking of policy-maker’s type by each citizen type is
0 0 a ∼0 b;
b b 0 b a;
a a 0 a b. (7)
(j denotes type j’s preference relation.) This leads to the following result:
Lemma 3. If untied tax reliefs are available, the Condorcet winner is a candidate of type 0.
Now consider a scenario with a subsidy tie-in (tax relief). If the policy-maker is of
type 0, the utility of all types is still Uj(0) = 1. If the policy-maker is of type j 6= 0, we
must distinguish three cases: (i) if η < (N − Ĝ)/N, the subsidy tie-in has no effect
and rankings are as for (7); (ii) if (N − Ĝ)/N < η ≤ η̃, the policy-maker selects a
tax rate tZ = 1− η, thus lowering the public provision of variety j and inducing zero
donations toward both varieties (all citizen types incur the cost of the tax, but only
variety j is provided); the rankings of candidate types in this case remain as for (7);
(iii) if η > η̃, the policy-maker selects a tax rate t = tS
′
, which supports a level Ĝ of
public provision of variety j and triggers private provision of variety j−; in this case
a type-j− citizen prefers a policy-maker of type j 6= 0 to one of type 0 if and only if
USj−(j 6= 0) > Uj(0) = 1.
With reference to case (iii), it is always possible to find a combinations of values
η and N for which, with a subsidy tie-in, type-j− voters prefer a type-j 6= 0 policy-
maker to a type-0 policy-maker. Two forces drive this result: first, when η is high
enough, say η > ˜̃η, type-j− individuals place a high valuation on their favoured
good variety; second, for N large enough, say N > Ñ, the per capita cost (per capita
tax) of both publicly providing public goods and subsidizing private provision is low.
Then citizens of type j− would prefer a policy-maker of type j 6= 0, who both selects a
low tax and subsidizes private donations toward variety j−, to a policy-maker of type
0 who chooses zero public provision and offers no subsidy. The ranking of candidate
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types by type-b voters under a subsidy tie-in changes to
b b a b 0. (8)
We can then state the following result:
Proposition 1. In the presence of a tied-in donation subsidy (tax relief), and for qa > qb,
sufficient conditions for a candidate of type a to be the Condorcet winner are η > η̃MIN and
N ≥ Ñ.
Proof in the Appendix.
Under these conditions, a tie-in induces a type-j 6= 0 policy-maker to offer a pos-
itive donation subsidy, decreasing the price of giving towards variety j− by j−-type
individuals and allowing them, in this way, to gain access to the public good vari-
ety that they prefer but would not be publicly provided otherwise. This makes a
type-j 6= 0 policy-maker more attractive to type-j− individuals in comparison with a
type-0 policy-maker.
3.2. Plurality voting
Consider now the case of plurality voting, in a scenario with the following fea-
tures: (i) the winning candidate is that which receives the most votes (relative ma-
jority); (ii) candidacy involves no cost; (iii) voting is sincere but candidate choices
are strategic (later we also briefly address the case where voting is strategic). Given
our assumption qj < 1/2, j ∈ J, no single type constitutes a majority, and so the
behaviour of two out of three types again dictates the outcome of the election. Again,
the most-preferred candidate type for each voter is always one of their own type, ir-
respectively of whether or not a subsidy tie-in is present. Thus, if a citizen of each
type j ∈ J stands for the election, each candidate j will receive qjN votes.
First we consider the case in which there are no tax-reliefs. Suppose a candidate
of type b stands for election. Under sincere voting, given the ranking preferences (7)
a type-a candidate would win the election. If no type-b citizen stands for election,
under sincere voting type-b citizens would vote for a type-0 candidate, who would
then win the election. Given that Ub(a) < Ub(0) when tax reliefs are not available,
and anticipating that candidacy of a type-b individual will result in a type-a candidate
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winning the election, citizens of type b will never stand for election and so type 0 wins
the electoral competition.13
When a subsidy tie-in (tax relief) is available and η > η̃MIN and N ≥ Ñ, the prefer-
ence ranking of type-b citizens becomes (8).
If a candidate of each type stands for election, under sincere voting each candidate
obtains qjN votes, and given qa > q0 > qb, a candidate of type a wins the election.
On the other hand, if a candidate of type 0 does not stand for election, type 0 citizens
are indifferent between a type-a and a type-b candidate, and so either type can win
the election. Given that the cost of candidacy is zero, type-0 citizens are indifferent
with respect to the decision of standing for election. If type-b citizens anticipate that
with no candidate of type 0 she would win the election, they would choose to stand,
and type-a citizens in this case would be indifferent about whether or not to stand.
Analogously, if type-a citizens anticipate that with no candidate of type 0 she would
win the election, they would choose to stand, and type-b citizens in this case would
be indifferent about whether or not to stand. Thus in any equilibrium of this game a
candidate of type j 6= 0 wins the election.
We can then state the following result:
Proposition 2. Under plurality voting, if citizen vote sincerely, candidacy choices are strate-
gic, and candidacy is costless, absent a tied-in subsidy (tax relief) a candidate of type 0 wins
the electoral competition. With a tied-in donation subsidy, sufficient conditions for a candidate
of type j 6= 0 to win the election are η > η̃MIN and N ≥ Ñ.
Again, a tie-in forces policy-makers of type j 6= 0 to offer a positive donation
subsidy that allows type-j− individuals to gain access to the public good variety they
prefer but that would not be publicly provided otherwise. By doing so, it prevents a
type-0 candidate winning.14
13Type-a citizens anticipate that a candidate of her own type never wins the election, and therefore
are indifferent about standing as candidates or not standing.
14If voting is strategic, results remain unchanged, with outcomes being driven by strategic voting
choices rather than by candidacy choices.
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4. Donation relief as an equilibrium outcome
4.1. Securing re-election
The results of the previous section show that tax relief can change the preference
ordering of citizens over candidates and, in this way, shape political outcomes. In this
section we demonstrate that, if temporary commitment over tax rules is feasible and
η > η̃MIN (i.e. if a tie-in constraint makes a difference for how candidates are ranked),
donation relief can be leveraged on strategically to secure re-election.
Suppose that elected candidates stay in office for one period. During her term in
office policy-makers can modify tax provisions, with the change coming into force in
the subsequent term. Specifically, consider a case in which a policy-maker of type
j 6= 0 can introduce (or remove) a non-discriminatory constraint, s(k) = t for k ∈ K,
with her decision coming into effect in the subsequent term and forcing her successor
in office to adopt a subsidy rate such that s(k) = t, ∀k ∈ K, for any tax rate, t, she
chooses.
If a new electoral contest is run and there is no tie-in constraint in place, the in-
cumbent would lose to a type-0 challenger. By committing to a tie-in, on the other
hand, the incumbent can secure either re-election or election of a type-j candidate,
and, by doing so, a payoff for her own type that exceeds the payoff under a type-0
policy-maker. This is because whenever the conditions for Proposition 1 and 2 apply,
a type-j− individual prefers the policy choice of a type-j policy-maker to that of a
type-0 policy-maker; and vice-versa.15
If, instead, a type-0 policy-maker is in office to begin with, then she would not
choose to introduce a tie-in constraint, which in turn would secure that a type-0 can-
didate would always be elected, indefinitely. So, if the choice of whether or not to
introduce a tie-in constraint is left to elected policy-makers, whether or not it will
arise depends on the type of the policy-maker in office in the first period; i.e. it is
fully path-dependent.
While a type-j 6= 0 policy-maker may wish to commit to a subsidy tie-in, she
would never want to enter into a commitment with respect to the tax rate, even if it
15Since the payoff to a type-j individual under a type-j− policy-maker is no less than the payoff to
a type-j− individual under a type-j policy-maker, and the payoffs of both types are the same under a
type-0 policy-maker.
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were possible (see Appendix B for a proof). In other words, the strategic use of tax
relief does not stem from policy-makers’ inability to commit to tax rates.
4.2. Donation relief in tax constitutions
A constraint that ties the subsidy rate to the tax rate could also arise at a con-
stitutional stage (stage 0) in which citizens have to vote, before the election takes
place, over the adoption of the tie-in constraint regardless of the type of future elected
policy-makers. Under the conditions for which Proposition 1 applies, a policy-maker
of type j 6= 0 will be elected in stage 1 if and only if a tie-in constraint is in place;
absent the constraint, a policy-maker of type 0 will win the election under both plu-
rality rules (Lemma 3 and Lemma 4). Then a constraint will receive the support of
both type-a and type-b individuals if their anticipated utility from introducing the
constraint is higher than the utility they would obtain with the election of a type-0
candidate. This is always the case whenever the conditions for Proposition 1 and 2
are met.
Figure 2 depicts the region of parameter values η and N (the shaded area) for
which a constitutional rule on granting tax relief for donations would receive majority
support – i.e. where Propositions 1 and 2 apply – for Ĝ = N/5 (implying tS = 1/4),
qb = 1/4 (implying Ĝ = N/5 < nb/(1− tS) = (N/4)/(3/4) = N/3), qa = 7/16,
q0 = 5/16, η = 1/(20N) and η̂ = 2/(3N).
Although most tax systems in developed economies offer tax relief for charitable
donations, tax relief provisions typically do not have constitutional force: tax provi-
sions can be changed, albeit more slowly than tax rates can. Nevertheless, even if
indefinite commitment over tax relief provisions is not a feature of tax constitutions,
for a subsidy tie-in to arise in political equilibrium it is enough to have rules in place
that make changing the structure of tax provisions sufficiently slow; in turn, it is easy
to show that such rules would receive majority support at a constitutional stage.
Suppose that there is a constitutional stage (stage 0) where citizens can vote on
whether or not to introduce a procedural rule such that changes to the structure of the
tax system take at least one term to be decided and enacted. At stage 1, a candidate
is chosen at random, after which the candidate selects taxes for stage 1 and decides
whether or not to introduce tax relief. An election is then carried out to select a stage-
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Figure 2: Agreement on a constitutional tie-in of donation subsidies to tax rates
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a type-0 policy-maker is selected in the first stage (which occurs with probability q0),
whether or not the procedural rule is introduced in stage 0 is irrelevant: she will never
introduce a tie-in constraint. If a type-j 6= 0 candidate is selected at stage 1 (which
occurs with probability 1− q0), she will introduce a subsidy tie-in (which will come
into force in stage 2) if and only if the rule has been introduced at stage 0; by doing
so, she will secure the election of a candidate of type j 6= 0 at stage 2,16 an outcome
that, when a subsidy tie-in is present, is preferred by both type-j 6= 0 individuals
to a type-0 candidate winning. This means that, at stage 0, introducing procedural
rule that slows down the reversal of tax relief provisions receives the support of both
type-a and type-b voters.
Donation relief can thus arise in equilibrium whether, at the constitutional stage,
citizen vote over the introduction of a permanent tie-in constraint or over the in-
troduction of tighter procedural rules for changing the structure of tax provisions
(including tax relief provisions).
4.3. Discussion
The preceding analysis has aimed to articulate a political-economy rationale for
donation relief, and has shown how it can arise as part of a political equilibrium. The
model we have used to develop our arguments is designed to highlight the structure
of the problem in its simplest possible form; but the arguments and conclusions do
not hinge on the specific assumptions we have made. For example, the symmetry
in preferences between individual types that value public goods is presentationally
convenient but is not essential.
We have also abstracted from income differentials: allowing for income hetero-
geneity would translate into heterogeneity in the private cost of public funds to dif-
ferent individual types, but would otherwise leave the structure of the problem un-
changed. A possible interpretation of our model is one where the preferences for dif-
ferent public good varieties by different types are locally different because of income
differentials – i.e. where the minority “swing” type of our model is a higher-income
type that regards the majority-favoured public good varieties as inferior to higher
16In the second period a candidate j 6= 0 is elected whenever the tie-in constraint is put in place, and
qj > qj− .
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quality varieties that are privately funded.17
Our discussion has focused on tax relief for giving, but a similar argument could
also be made with respect to tax relief that is offered for semi-private or fully pri-
vate expenditures (e.g. private health care expenditures). Indeed, tax relief can be
viewed as a particular instance of “secondary” government measures that are struc-
turally nested (explicitly or implicitly) in other measures – structurally in the sense
of involving comparatively more inertia with respect to policy changes. A broader
implication of our analysis is then that such secondary measures may play a key role
in shaping policy outcomes with respect to the main measures that they accompany,
and may play a strategic role in securing political consensus.
5. Concluding remarks
Tax incentives for giving are present in the tax systems of most developed econo-
mies. A key feature of these provisions is that they are linked to the level of taxation
and are difficult to reverse. In this paper, we have shown that tax relief on dona-
tions protects minorities from outcomes where high taxes are exclusively used to fi-
nance provision of public goods that these minorities do not value. Through these
incentives, political forces can cement alliances that would otherwise not be able to
coalesce.
If we look at the history of tax institutions, and at how tax relief is used in practice,
we find clues that point to tax relief being used to mediate differences in policy pref-
erences. In the case of the US, for example, the charitable deduction was instituted in
1917 simultaneously with a substantial tax hike on the very rich to support the war
effort. And, although the stated rationale at the time for introducing the deduction
was to promote “social spending” that would support lower-income groups and the
poor, looking at the current distribution of US charitable contributions by category,
17With progressive income taxation, the subsidy implied by income tax relief on donations towards
the public goods that are favoured by higher-income minorities is higher than the average rate of tax-
ation, and so the appeal of income tax deductions for those minorities is even stronger. Our analytical
setting can readily be modified to allow for different levels of income and different (but interlinked)
marginal rates of taxation for types a and b, with no change in the structure of the arguments and no
change in conclusions.
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we see that only a fraction of total contributions can be considered to be redistributive
(Clotfelter, 2016).18
Our argument also has relevance for a long-standing puzzle surrounding dona-
tion relief: as Roberts (1984) first pointed out, even if we abstract from any hetero-
geneity in preferences for public goods, tax relief for donations can only be rational-
ized as being part of an optimal policy mix if the absolute value of the price elas-
ticity of giving exceeds unity; if it less than unity, then directly providing the pub-
lic goods or directly transferring funds to charities are more effective ways of using
public funds. Yet the empirical evidence seems to suggest that giving is relatively
price-inelastic – for UK donors, for example, Almunia et al. (2018) obtain a central
estimate of about −0.1. The political-economy rationale that we have highlighted
in our analysis can help us reconcile this evidence with the tax institutions that we
observe.
18Another clue comes from the evolution of provisions for “tax expenditures” (not limited to char-
itable deductions) in the US tax code between 1980 and 2000: they were tightened by Republican
administrations in the 1980s and then relaxed by later Democratic administrations, despite the fact the
provisions predominantly benefit higher-income minorities. In the UK, the question of whether do-
nation incentives should be fully tied to taxation took center stage during 2008/2009 (see Scharf and
Smith, 2015), when proposals were considered that would decouple the level of relief from marginal
tax rates and introduce a composite relief rate for donors in all tax brackets. The proposals were later
abandoned – arguably for political reasons.
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Appendix A Proofs of lemmas and propositions
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
It is easy to show that a policy-maker of type j 6= 0 always prefers to provide her favoured
good variety (j) through public provision rather than subsidize donations towards it. First,
given that η̂ < 1/N and that triggering donations towards j would involve her own type
making contributions, the policy-maker would never select a policy such that G(j) > Ĝ,
either through public provision or through subsidies or a combination of the two, because in
all cases this would involve a private marginal private cost for type j of no less than 1/N. To
see this, note that a necessary and sufficient condition for a subsidy to be preferable to public
provision, from the point of view of a policy-maker of type j 6= 0, in order to finance provision






+ (1− s(j)) vj(j) = s(j)
Ĝ
N
+ (1− s(j)) Ĝ
qjN
. (9)
This would require qj > 1, which is a contradiction.19
A policy-maker of type j 6= 0 could conceivably wish to subsidize donations towards
variety j− (her less favoured public good variety) in order to induce donors of type j− to
supply the variety she favours relatively less at a low cost to its own type, making diverting
tax revenues to partially fund the provision of variety j− worthwhile to type j despite the fact
that η < 1/N. However, it can be shown that doing so will never be optimal for a type-j 6= 0
policy-maker. First, the policy-maker would never adopt a positive subsidy rate for variety
j− such that individuals of her own type (type j) make donations towards variety j− – as the
private cost to individuals of type j in this case would be 1/N > η. Suppose instead that the
policy-maker adopts a positive subsidy rate such that only citizens of type j− make private
donations toward variety j−, i.e. such that η < 1− s(j−) < η (which results in a level of
private provision of variety j− equal to Ĝ).
In this case, we know from our previous argument that she would choose Z(j) = Ĝ, and
so her payoff would be Uj(cj, G) = 1 − t′ + (η + η) Ĝ, with t′ = (1 + s(j−)) Ĝ/N, which
covers public provision of variety j and the subsidization of private provision of variety j− by
type j− individuals, both at level Ĝ. The minimum level of subsidy that can sustain donations
towards variety j− (and that maximizes the policy-maker’s payoff in this regime) is s(j−) =
19The above discrete comparison does not consider combinations where public good variety j is
partly publicly provided and partly privately provided by subsidized donations. However, it is easy
to verify that if the donation subsidy is set optimally for a given level of Zj < Ĝ (so as to induce a total
volume of donations equal to Ĝ− Zj), it is always optimal for the policymaker to increase Zj up to Ĝ,
which in turn chokes private contributions.
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1− η, and so the policy-maker’s payoff can be expressed as
Uj(cj, G) =1− (2− η) Ĝ/N + (η + η) Ĝ
=1− Ĝ/N + η Ĝ +
(
η − (1− η)/N
)
Ĝ. (10)
With a zero subsidy, on the other hand, the policy-maker’s payoff is
Uj(cj, G) = 1− Ĝ/N + η Ĝ, (11)
which is greater than or equal to (10) if and only if η < (1− η)/N, which never holds under
Assumption 1. Thus a policy-maker of type j 6= 0 will always choose a policy (Z, t, s) such
that subsidy rates does not trigger donations toward either varieties ( 1− s(k) > η ) and the
tax rate, t = Ĝ/N ≡ tN , is such that she publicly provides only the variety she likes most at
level Z(j) = Ĝ, and does not fund the public good she likes less, Z(j−) = 0.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
As previously shown (Lemma 1), a policy-maker of type j 6= 0 would, without a tie-in,
choose s(k) to be less than 1− η (and thus to have no effect on donations if positive), and a
tax rate tN = Ĝ/N. Then, if 1− tN > η, i.e. if η < (N − Ĝ)/N a subsidy tie-in at the policy-
maker preferred rate of taxation has no effect, and so it does not constrain the policy-maker’s
choice, which remains unchanged under a tie in. If, however, η̂ < 1− tN < η, i.e.
η ≥ N − Ĝ
N
, (12)
under a constraint s = t, selecting a level of taxation equal to tN trigger donations by type
j− towards variety j−, and this would in turn reduce public provision of variety j below Ĝ
and thus also trigger donations by type j towards variety j. Thus, whenever (12) holds, the
policy-maker could either choose to raise the tax rate (and thus the subsidy rate) to the level,
tS, that generates enough revenue to publicly provide Z(j) = Ĝ units of variety j and cover
the cost of subsidies to private giving towards variety j−; or she could reduce the tax rate,
tZ, to the point where the subsidy become ineffective at triggering donations, which requires
public provision of variety j to be reduced below Ĝ.
Under the first option, where the policy-maker chooses t = s = tS > 1− η, if donations





However, if (1− tS′)Ĝ > nj− , where nj− = qj−N, then donations towards variety j− by j−
individuals exhaust their income before their total level of subsidized donations reaches Ĝ,
and so net-of-subsidy donations towards variety j− equal nj− , and the subsidized level of
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provision becomes nj−/(1 − tS) < Ĝ. The government’s budget constraint in this case is
tSN = Ĝ + tSnj−/(1− tS), giving
tS =
Ĝ + N − nj− −
√
(Ĝ + N − nj−)2 − 4NĜ
2N
≡ tS′′. (14)
Let then G̃ be the level of public good such that tS′ = tS′′:
G̃ =
N + nj− −
√
N2 + nj−2 − 6Nnj−
4
. (15)
For Ĝ ≤ G̃ the tax rates are such that tS′ ≤ tS′′, whereas for Ĝ > G̃ we have tS′ > tS′′. Thus, a
policymaker would choose a tax rate tS = tS′ if Ĝ ≤ G̃ and a tax rate tS = tS′′ if Ĝ > G̃.
For Ĝ > G̃, it is always the case that tS = tS′′ < tS′ < 1− η̂ and G < Ĝ. For Ĝ ≤ G̃, on the
other hand, tS = tS′ < tS′′; and so, in principle, it would be possible for donations towards
variety j− to rise above Ĝ if tS′′ > 1− η̂. It is easy to show that this case can be ruled out: both




N2 + nj−2 − 6Nnj−
2N
< 1/2 < 1− 1/N < 1− η̂ (16)
(since N ≥ 3 and η̂ < 1/N, by assumption). Thus, for Ĝ ≤ G̃ we always have tS =
min{tS′, tS′′} < 1− η̂.
The rest of our analysis will focus on the case Ĝ ≤ G̃, ruling out unrealistic scenario where,
with a subsidy s = tS, j−-type individuals would use all of their income to make donations
towards collective consumption, making their private consumption equal to zero.
The alternative option for the policy-maker is to choose to publicly provide variety j at a
level below Ĝ and lower t up to a point where it equals
tZ = 1− η, (17)
the minimum subsidy rate that does not trigger donations. When this applies, however, it
would always pay to marginally lower the tax rate further so as to shut down donations
by all types, as doing so would divert funds from provision of variety j− to that of variety
j, resulting in a gain to the policy-maker equal to (η − η) tZ N. This implies that the policy-
maker’s optimal choice can be determined simply by comparing the level of payoff the policy-
maker obtains for t = tS, where Z(j) = Ĝ and there are donations V(j−) = min{Ĝ, nj−/(1−
tS)} subsidized at rate tS with the corresponding level of payoff for t = tZ (or more precisely
just below it) in a regime where there are no private donations and public provision of variety
j is at level tZ N < Ĝ.
We next compare the level of payoff the policy-maker obtains for t = tS = tS′ with the
level of payoff the policy-maker would obtain for t = tZ. A type j policy-maker always
29
prefers a tax rate tS to a tax rate tZ, if and only if
(η + η)Ĝ− tS = (η + η)Ĝ− Ĝ
N − Ĝ
> ηNtZ − tZ = (1− η)(ηN − 1). (18)
The difference between the left- and right-hand sides of the inequality is increasing in η and
decreasing in η, and so the minimum value of η that satisfies the inequality, which we shall
denote as η̃, is a decreasing function of η. Then a value of η that satisfies the inequality for
η = 0 will also do so for any value of η between zero and 1/N. Setting η = 0 and solving for
the value of η that makes the condition binding, we obtain
η >
N + 1− Ĝ +
√
(1 + N − Ĝ)2 − 4N(1− Ĝ/(N − Ĝ))
2N
≡ η̃MIN, (19)
which is always greater than the lower bound 1/(N − Ĝ) in (12). Condition (19) thus repre-
sents a sufficient condition for a subsidy tie-in constraint to induce the policy-maker to offer
a positive level subsidy for donations on j−20.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a scenario with a subsidy tie-in (tax relief). If the policy-maker is of type j = 0,
the utility of all types is still Uj(0) = 1. If the policy-maker is of type j 6= 0, then we must
distinguish three cases: (i) if η < (N − Ĝ)/N, the subsidy tie-in has no effect and rankings
are as for (7); (ii) if (N − Ĝ)/N < η ≤ η̃, utility for type j− under a j 6= 0-type policy-
maker is 1 − tZ + ηtZ N = 1 − (1 − η)(1 − ηN) ≡ UZj−(j 6= 0) < 1 (since η < 1/N), and
utility for type 0 is 1− tZ = η ≡ Uj−(j 6= 0) < 1 – the rankings of candidate types in this
case thus remain as for (7); (iii) if η > η̃ utility for type j− under a j 6= 0 policy-maker is
1− tS − (1− tS)Ĝ/(qj−N) + (η + η)Ĝ ≡ USj−(j 6= 0). This is greater than Uj(0) = 1 if and
only if
η >
(1 + qj−)N − 2Ĝ− η(N − Ĝ)qj−N
(N − Ĝ)qj−
≡ ˜̃η. (20)
The limit for N → ∞ of the difference η̃ − ˜̃η j− is 1 + η > 0. Thus, by continuity, there must be
a value Ñ ≥ 0 satisfying
η̃ − ˜̃η ≥ 0, Ñ ≥ 0, Ñ(η̃ − ˜̃η) = 0, (21)
20The policy-maker could also shut down donations towards variety j− by selecting t = 1 and
Z(j) = N. This is preferred to the above outcome if ηĜ + η̂(N − Ĝ) > 1− Ĝ/(N − Ĝ) + (η + η)Ĝ.
Solving for the minimum value of η̂ that satisfies this, we find that it equals 1/N for Ĝ = 0 and is
increasing in Ĝ for Ĝ < N/2 (as assumed). Thus, the restriction η̂ < 1/N rules out this possibility.
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above which η > η̃ > ˜̃η. Then, for η > η̃ and N > Ñ, the rankings of candidate types by
type-b voters under a subsidy tie-in will change to
b b a b 0; (22)
and so preference rankings become
0 0 a ∼0 b;
b b b b 0;
a a b a 0. (23)
Thus, under a subsidy tie-in the Condorcet winner is a type-a candidate.
Appendix B Committing to a tax rate
Suppose that a policy-maker of type a is in office. If a candidate of her type is a Condorcet
winner in the absence of any constraints, then commitment over the level of taxation is im-
material. If a candidate of type 0 is a Condorcet winner in the absence of constraints, then
committing to a tax t = t0 = 0 could allow a type j 6= 0 to secure re-election but re-election
would produce the same allocation of resources as if a type-0 candidate had won. Still, a
policy-maker of type j 6= 0 could commit to a positive tax rate that is equal to or below tN and
support a level of provision of variety j that is equal to or below Ĝ. Restricting attention to
equilibria that do not rely on weakly undominated strategies, a type-j 6= 0 could also not se-
cure re-election by committing to a tax rate t ∈ (0, tN ].21 We can conclude that a policy-maker
of type a never commits to a tax rate.
21There exists an equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies in which a type-a policy maker pegs
the tax rate at t = tN and a type-0 policy-maker (who does not place any value on winning per se and
is indifferent between alternative uses of public funds) devotes all funds to provide variety a if elected
(off the equilibrium path); voters of both type 0 and type b are then indifferent between a type-0 and a
type-a candidate, which in turn makes it possible for a type-a candidate to be re-elected.
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